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We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic 
markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be 
beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national 
merger, the policies enacted by a national merger authority tend to be overly restrictive from a 
global efficiency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that benefit the merging 
firms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire 
approach is also globally efficient. Finally, we derive the properties of the endogenous merger 
equilibrium. 
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In political circles the argument is sometimes put forth that mergers of domestic ¯rms
have the advantage of creating `global players', i.e. bigger ¯rms that will be in a better
position to compete with foreign ¯rms in world markets. A recent example in Germany
has been the merger between the E.ON and Ruhrgas corporations. The German Federal
Cartel O±ce rejected the merger in 2002, and this decision was backed by the scienti¯c
Monopoly Commission. Nevertheless, the German Minister of Economics eventually
cleared the merger in 2003, overruling the decision by the cartel authority. A main
reason for the positive decision of the Ministry of Economics was the `global player'
argument, which was considered to be very important at the onset of energy market
liberalization in Europe.1
The international competitiveness of domestic ¯rms is an explicit policy objective in
the merger guidelines of several countries, including Canada, France, Sweden and the
U.K (see RÄ oller, Stennek and Verboven, 2000). According to this policy goal a merger
can serve the national interest by increasing the market share of domestic ¯rms in
world markets. A second possibility for a merger to improve national welfare, at the
expense of foreigners, is that it raises prices for consumers in world markets. Hence,
merger policy may be associated with similar goals as strategic export subsidies or tax
exporting measures (Brander and Spencer, 1985).
The literature on `strategic' merger policies has taken two di®erent routes. A ¯rst
set of papers focuses on nationally optimal merger policies and merger pro¯tability
when trade policy instruments are simultaneously available to national governments
(Richardson, 1999; Horn and Levinsohn, 2001; Huck and Konrad, 2004; De Stefano
and Rysman, 2004). A second line of research is based on the concept of the `external
e®ects' of a merger introduced by Farrell and Shapiro (1990). This concept has been
extended to an open economy setting by Barros and Cabrol (1994) and Head and Ries
(1997), who di®erentiate between the external e®ects of the merger on other agents in
the home country (i.e., consumers and ¯rms not participating in the merger), and the
external e®ects on agents in other countries. This literature has derived rather general
1The importance of the `global player' argument in the context of the E.ON-Ruhrgas merger is
also stressed by Sinn (2002, pp. 10-12.)
1conditions under which a merger bene¯ts, or harms, the parties not participating in
the merger. It does not, however, explicitly consider the (possible) cost reductions
accompanying a merger, and therefore cannot provide a complete characterization of
the post-merger equilibrium.
In this paper we take a di®erent approach by setting up a simple, linear model of
Cournot competition in open economies that incorporates the possible cost reductions
caused by a merger and is able to make comparisons over discrete merger equilibria.
Hence we analyse, in an international setting, the basic trade-o® that exists for merger
policy when the merger has anti-competitive e®ects, but also leads to reduced produc-
tion costs. This trade-o®, ¯rst analysed by Williamson (1968) for the case of a closed
economy, is often referred to as the `e±ciency defense' for a merger. The European
Union's new merger control guidelines explicitly acknowledge the possibility of such
e±ciency gains, and foresee that these enter the Commission's overall assessment of
any merger proposal (European Union, 2004, C31/13).
A second di®erence to the existing literature is that we focus on a three-country model
where two competitors in each of two countries serve their respective home markets,
and all ¯rms jointly compete in a third (world) market. This market structure captures
the situation in many network industries, such as electricity, natural gas, telecommu-
nications or railways. A typical example is the electricity market, where the German
duopolists E:ON and RWE compete with other `national champions' in several Euro-
pean markets, including Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and the United
Kingdom. It is also relevant in other markets (for cement, dairy products, etc.) where
large national players compete in third markets, but less so in the respective home
markets of their competitors.
In this setting we analyze whether a merger is in the interest of the ¯rms involved,
the home country, and the world as a whole. The simplicity of our model allows us to
explicitly link the producer surplus and welfare e®ects of a merger to two core parame-
ters, the cost reduction accompanying the merger and the relative size of the home and
the foreign market. Moreover, it is straightforward in our three-country framework to
carry out parallel analyses of national and international mergers, and to compare the
2di®erent e®ects.2 This comparison reveals that national and international mergers have
rather di®erent implications in our setting. For national mergers, a potential con°ict
of interest arises between the merging ¯rms and a national regulator, and the poli-
cies enacted by national merger authorities tend to be overly restrictive from a global
e±ciency perspective. In contrast, all international mergers that bene¯t the merging
¯rms will be cleared by either a national or a regional regulator, and this laissez-faire
approach is also globally e±cient.
In a ¯nal step, we analyse whether national mergers, international mergers or no merg-
ers will be the equilibrium market structure, once again relating di®erent regimes to
di®erent combinations of cost savings and relative market size. These features link
our model to the recent literature on cross-border mergers and on endogenous merger
equilibria (Horn and Persson, 2001a,b; Bjorvatn, 2004; Lommerud et al., 2005).
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of our analysis.
Section 3 analyzes the conditions under which national mergers are in the interest of the
merging ¯rms. Section 4 turns to optimal merger policy from the perspectives of a single
country, and the (model) world as a whole. Section 5 discusses the analogous e®ects
for an international merger. Section 6 analyses the characteristics of the endogenous
merger equilibrium. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we set up a simple model which allows us to analyze some of the
dimensions associated with merger policy and the creation of global players. The focus
is on an open economy, called the home country H, where the market for a certain
good is served by two domestic producers. The same two ¯rms also export to a market
abroad, referred to as the world market and indexed W. In the domestic market the
two ¯rms do not face any competition, whereas on the market abroad they compete
with two ¯rms from another country, called the foreign country, F. These two foreign
¯rms in addition supply the good to their respective domestic market, where again
they are the only suppliers. The model framework is illustrated in Figure 1.
2The strong increase in international mergers since the 1980s is documented in Gugler et al. (2003).
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The two domestic ¯rms consider merging, and we shall also study the consequences
of merger plans on the part of the two foreign companies. As far as possible we rely
on symmetry in setting up the model. Prior to any merger, all ¯rms have the same
(constant) level of marginal cost; all markets are characterized by Cournot competition;
and the size of the two `national' markets in H and F are equal. The world market W
may be bigger than any of the local markets.
A few remarks on the model are in order. In deciding on the model, our criteria have
been that we wish to study merger policy in an open economy; in particular we wish to
shed some light on the creation of `global players', i.e. ¯rms which besides being large in
the national market are also important players in the world market. So a merger in the
model should have international consequences. At the same time, a merged company
should still be facing competition from other ¯rms; these we have placed in the foreign
country. For symmetry reasons, also the competitors regard the world market as a
market abroad, while at the same time serving their respective own market.3
3As an alternative, we could have set up a two-country model, in which ¯rms in both countries
serve each other's market. In that model, a symmetric set-up of the two countries would have been
natural. However, that set-up would not correspond well with the image related to creation of global
players in a world market. Hence, we opted for the three-market framework above.
4In line with much of the literature on merger policy we take imperfect competition
to be of the Cournot-Nash type in all markets and the good under consideration to
be homogeneous. Moreover, markets are segmented and ¯rms maximize pro¯ts in each
market separately.4
The domestic market is given by the inverted demand schedule5
p = a ¡ b(x1 + x2); a > 1: (1)
The price in the domestic market is labeled p, and the linear demand schedule is
characterized by the intercept a and the slope parameter b. The intercept a measures
the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for the ¯rst unit of the good, while
the size of the market is determined primarily by the slope parameter b. The two home
country ¯rms supply x1 and x2, respectively, prior to merger, and they do so facing a
marginal cost of unity (which is why a > 1 must hold in our model). There are no ¯xed
costs, and the number of domestic ¯rms (two) is held ¯xed, except for the possibility
of a merger of the two.
Quite conventionally, the maximization of pro¯ts in the two duopoly ¯rms results in
quantities supplied of x1 = x2 = (a ¡ 1)=(3b) and a market price of p = (a + 2)=3, i.e.
(a ¡ 1)=3 above the unitary marginal cost.
The domestic ¯rms are fully owned by residents of the home country whereas the foreign
¯rms are owned by residents of the foreign country. In the home country, consumer
surplus cs and joint producer surplus of the two ¯rms, ps, each amounts to








4Again, several alternatives are available, including Bertrand competition (most meaningfully with
di®erentiated goods) and monopolistic competition. It is well known from the work of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), however, that modelling a two-stage game with capacity competition and subse-
quent price competition between ¯rms yields the same results as the simple Cournot model. See also
Hay and Werden (1991) for theoretical and empirical arguments in defense of the Cournot model. At
the same time, in lieu of segmented markets one could have postulated one big integrated market as
in Barros and Cabral (1994) and Head and Ries (1997); yet, that corresponds less well with an image
of global players with a base in their domestic market.
5The demand schedule can be derived in a general equilibrium framework from a quadratic and
quasi-linear utility function.
5Hence, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses, total surplus ts, is twice the









In line with the `e±ciency defense' literature on mergers we adopt total surplus as the
basic welfare measure in our analysis.6
The two home ¯rms both service the market abroad and do so together with the two
¯rms in the foreign country. There, the inverted demand curve is
P = a ¡ B(X1 + X2 + Y1 + Y2): (4)
Upper-case letters generally refer to the world market (and lower-case letters to the
domestic market). Hence, X1;X2 are the supplies of the two home ¯rms, while Y1;Y2
denote supplies of the two foreign ¯rms. The slope parameter B will in general be
di®erent from the slope parameter b for the market in the home country. A world
market which is bigger than the national market is represented by B < b .
Maximizing pro¯ts, all four ¯rms supply the quantity X1 = X2 = Y1 = Y2 = (a ¡
1)=(5B), yielding a price of P = (a+4)=5, lying (a¡1)=5 above unitary marginal cost.



















Finally, the domestic market in the foreign country, assumed to be served exclusively
by the two foreign ¯rms, is a complete mirror image of the parallel market in the home
country, so there is no need to go into details.
6The alternative view is that merger control authorities base their decisions solely on the maxi-
mization of consumer surplus. Clougherty (2005) presents some recent evidence that the merger policy
conducted by the United States during the period 1997-2001 was driven primarily by considerations
of consumer welfare, rather than total national surplus. He emphasizes, however, that results may be
di®erent for other countries, in particular for small open economies.
63 National mergers: the ¯rm perspective
In this section we consider the incentives for the two domestic ¯rms to merge and
become one ¯rm in the domestic market as well as in the world market. We thus seek
to identify the situations in which the sum of producer surpluses on the part of the two
¯rms from both the domestic and world markets stands to increase following a merger.
If the two ¯rms merge we postulate, in line with the discussion of several of the motives
for mergers in practice,7 that the merged ¯rm realizes a reduction of marginal cost of
¢ ¸ 0, so that it falls to 1 ¡ ¢. As a special case, there may be no cost reduction at
all, ¢ = 0, but we shall generally allow for a lowering of marginal cost (and conversely
ignore any possibility of a cost increase). On many occasions below, the size of the cost
reduction will determine whether a merger will be in the interest of the ¯rms involved
or other parties a®ected by the merger.
A merger of the two domestic ¯rms results in a monopoly in the domestic market. In
consequence, pro¯t maximization will result in a quantity of xM = [(a ¡ 1) + ¢]=(2b)
and a market price of pM = [(a+1)¡¢]=2, i.e. [(a¡1)+¢]=2 above the new marginal
cost of (1 ¡ ¢). The superscript `M' stands for merger of home ¯rms, where needed.




















Compared with the previous duopoly situation, as long as the cost reduction is non-
negative, the move to monopoly will for sure increase producer surplus.
We next turn to the consequence of the domestic merger for the world market. For
later use we distinguish between two cases: In the ¯rst, no merger has taken place
between the foreign ¯rms; in the second, there already has been a merger between the
two foreign ¯rms.
7RÄ oller et al. (2000, pp. 12-13) distinguish between rationalization, economies of scale, technological
progress, purchasing economies, and reduction of slack as the possible sources of e±ciency gains
following a merger. They observe that savings in variable costs may come in all ¯ve forms.
7Case 1: No foreign merger
At the same time as the merged ¯rm becomes a monopoly in the national market, it
will be one of three suppliers on the market abroad. Pro¯t maximization implies sales
of the monopolist and its foreign competitors to the world market equal to XM =
[a ¡ 1 + 3¢]=(4B), respectively Y M
1 = Y M
2 = [a ¡ 1 ¡ ¢]=(4B). The price resulting
from these quantities is P M = [a+3¡¢]=4, resulting in producer surplus on the part





















where a subscript `N' is here used to distinguish non-merged (foreign) ¯rms.
Comparing (9) with (5) we can ¯nd the condition under which the merged ¯rms'
pro¯ts in the world market rise as a consequence of the merger. This is ¢ > (a ¡
1)(
p
1:28¡1)=3 ¼ (a¡1)0:044. This can be compared with the condition under which
the market share of the merged ¯rm (XM) will exceed the market share of the two
foreign ¯rms (Y M
1 + Y M
2 ). This latter condition is seen to be ¢ > (a ¡ 1)=5 and thus
requires a substantially higher cost reduction following the merger.8 The reason for this
di®erence is that the consumer price will increase in the world market, following the
reduction in the number of ¯rms from four to three.
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A merger will only be in the two home ¯rms' interest, if the former sum exceeds the










































8The °ip side to this is that the market share of the foreign ¯rms will rise when ¢ < (a ¡ 1)=5.
8The formula comprises the gains and losses from merging. First, there is a gain from
greater monopoly power and concentration in the domestic market (the ¯rst part of
the ¯rst term). Second, at unchanged costs, there is a loss of market share in the world
market (the second part of the ¯rst term). Third, whatever cost reduction may ensue
from the merger obviously bene¯ts the merged ¯rm in both markets (the second and
third terms).
Without any drop in marginal cost, only the former two e®ects matter. It is easily seen
that the condition for a merger to be pro¯table for the merging ¯rms then is B=b > 0:63.
In other words, the world market should not be much larger than the domestic market,
if the net gain from the merger absent cost reduction is to be positive. A natural
benchmark for the size of the world market, given the presence of four ¯rms there
initially against only two in each national market, might be that it is twice as large as
any national market in the sense that B = b=2. In our model, this relative size of the
world market is not compatible with a net gain from merging in the case where the
merger does not result in any lowering of marginal cost.
Underlying these results is the well-known feature that the assumptions of Cournot
competition in all markets and a homogeneous good are not very `friendly' towards
merger. Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) have shown that in the absence of any
cost reductions, aggregate pro¯ts of the merging ¯rms will fall, unless the post-merger
market share of these ¯rms is at least 80% in the case of linear demands. In our model
this condition for the merger to be pro¯table is met in the domestic market, but not
in the world market.9
Incorporating the possibility of a reduction of marginal cost in the merged ¯rm, the
condition on the size of cost reduction for the two home ¯rms to willingly merge is




(63 ¡ 100R)(4R + 9)=225 + (4R + 3)2
(4R + 3)2 ¡ 1
#
(12)
where we have used R ´ B=b to measure the size of the home market relative to the
9Results are di®erent under Bertrand competition and heterogeneous goods, where mergers increase
pro¯ts under rather general conditions (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985). The likelihood for mergers to
increase pro¯ts is also raised under Cournot competition when product heterogeneity is accounted for
(Lommerud and S¿rgard, 1997). For a recent summary of arguments why mergers can be pro¯table
for the merging ¯rms, even in a Cournot framework, see Huck, Konrad and Mueller (2005).
9world market. The larger is the relative size of the world market, i.e. the lower is R,
the higher is the minimal cost reduction ~ ¢ required to make the merger pro¯table. In
the complete absence of a world market (R ! 1), l' H^ opital's rule gives a ~ ¢ < 0. In
the other limiting case of an arbitrarily large world market (R ! 0), the critical cost
reduction reaches an upper bound. Setting R = 0 in (12) yields ~ ¢ = (a ¡ 1) (
p
1:28 ¡
1)=3 ¼ (a¡1)0:044. This is just the condition for the merged ¯rm's pro¯ts to increase
in the world market. We sum up our ¯ndings in
Result 1. (Domestic merger only.) A merger between the two home ¯rms will increase
their producer surplus, provided (12) holds. The larger is the world market, relative to
the home market, the higher is the cost reduction needed for the merger to be pro¯table.
Case 2: Foreign ¯rms have merged
For future use we quickly go through the same steps as above on the assumption that
the two foreign competitors have already merged. On account of symmetry in the
model we then know that the cost reduction enabled by a merger and thus enjoyed by
the foreign companies must ful¯ll the requirement in (12) above. Given this, will the
domestic ¯rms have an incentive to merge, too?
If they merge, the home market moves from duopoly to monopoly, just as above. In the
world market, rather than having two home ¯rms and a merged foreign ¯rm, a duopoly
between a merged foreign ¯rm and a merged home ¯rm ensues. Maximizing pro¯ts,
and denoting by `MM' the situation of double merger, they sell XMM = Y MM =
[a ¡ 1 + ¢]=(3B) at a price of P MM = [a + 2 ¡ 2¢]=(3), which is (a ¡ 1 + ¢)=3 above
the new marginal cost of 1¡¢ of both merged ¯rms. From this, the home merged ¯rm










The two home ¯rms will have an incentive to merge, provided the sum of producer
surpluses in (8) and (13) dominates the sum of producer surpluses in (2) and (10). Is
this the case for cost reductions greater than ~ ¢ in (12)?
The answer to this question turns out to be a±rmative. The argument proceeds in
three steps. (i) From the symmetry of our set-up and the fact that the foreign ¯rms























































































have merged, we can infer that the net advantage from this ¯rst merger, (psM+PSM)¡
(ps+PS) [see the formulas (8), (9), (2) and (5)] is non-negative. Further, it obviously
increases in ¢, and the relevant value of ¢ having led to the ¯rst merger must therefore
be at least as large as ~ ¢. (ii) The net advantage of the second, home ¯rm merger can
be written as (psM + PSMM) ¡ (ps + PSM
N ) [using formulas (13) and (10)]. This net
advantage is also increasing in ¢. (iii) The di®erence between the two net advantage
expressions, equal to (PSMM ¡PSM
N )¡(PSM ¡PS), is easily seen to be greater than
zero for ¢ < (a ¡ 1)=5, which itself is greater than ~ ¢. All in all, if the net advantage
from the ¯rst merger is positive, so is the net advantage from the second. Thus, if
foreign ¯rms have merged, so will the domestic ones.
Result 2. (Domestic merger, given foreign merger.) If foreign companies have already
merged, so will the domestic ¯rms.
Conditional merger equilibria
The relevant producer surpluses for the home ¯rms, respectively the foreign ¯rms, are
summed up in Table 1 for the two situations of non-merger (N) and merger (M). In
each cell, the upper line gives the producer surplus in the home country while the lower
line describes producer surplus in the foreign country.
On the basis of Results 1 and 2 we can now conclude that the game between the group
of home ¯rms and the group of foreign ¯rms has two possible merger equilibria, when
11only national mergers are considered.10 One equilibrium, the no-merger situation (N,N),
is the outcome for cost reductions ¢ < ~ ¢, while the other, `twin-merger', equilibrium
(M,M) emerges for ¢ > ~ ¢.
Why is it that the asymmetric situation of (M,N) or (N,M), where one group of ¯rms
merges and the other group does not, will not appear as a Nash-equilibrium? The
answer is that for a group of ¯rms it is more attractive to move from a three-¯rm
situation in the world market to duopoly there than from a four-¯rm situation to the
three-¯rm situation. In both cases, the loss of market share (absent any cost reduction)
is one sixth, but the increase in market concentration delivers a bigger push to the world
market price, when the number of ¯rms there goes from three to two as compared to
from four to three.
Result 3. (National merger equilibria.) For cost reductions lower than ~ ¢ in (12), the
Nash equilibrium will entail home and foreign ¯rms abstaining from merging. For cost
reductions in excess of ~ ¢, the Nash merger equilibrium will imply both groups of ¯rms
merging. Asymmetric merger equilibria do not occur in our set-up.
4 Optimal policy towards national mergers
4.1 Nationally optimal merger policy
In this section we analyse the conditions under which a national merger will raise
total surplus in the home country, and will therefore be accepted by national merger
control authorities. By adding the producer and consumer surplus measures derived
in the previous sections, we can derive total surplus for the home and foreign country,
respectively, and for each of the di®erent merger scenarios.11 This is given in Table 2.
As a preliminary step, we determine the condition for a merger to be in the interest
of domestic consumers. From the comparison of (2) and (7) consumers stand to gain
10This is why we speak here of `conditional' merger equilibria. The characteristics of the uncondi-
tional merger equilibrium will be discussed in Section 6.
11Note that the change in consumer surplus is independent of whether foreign ¯rms have already
merged or not, since ¯rms in country H do not serve consumers in F and vice versa.
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Hence, consumer surplus will go down, unless it is accompanied by a cost reduction
that is substantially higher than the one needed for the merger to increase producer
surplus, even if the world market is large (cf. Result 1). In our model this characterizes
the `rather impressive synergies' (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990, 114) that are needed for a
merger to reduce consumer prices.12
Now let ¢¤ be the critical cost reduction beyond which total domestic surplus increases
following a merger and recall that R = B=b measures the size of the home market
relative to the world market. In the appendix we derive ¢¤ as a function of R = B=b:
¢




(6R + 9)(250R + 63)=225 + (6R + 3)2
(6R + 3)2 ¡ 1
#
: (15)
It is immediately seen that the merger must always be accompanied by a cost reduction,
if it is to increase total domestic surplus. If the foreign market is in¯nitely large (R = 0),
then (15) reduces to ¢¤ = (a ¡ 1)(
p
1:28 ¡ 1)=3 = ~ ¢. In this case the home market
does not matter, so the conditions for increasing producer surplus and total national
surplus are identical. In the opposite polar case where only the home market matters
(R ! 1), the critical value ¢¤ reaches its maximum of ¢¤jR!1 ¼ (a ¡ 1) 0:089.
12Strictly speaking, if in our simple model a ¸ 4, a rise in consumer surplus is completely ruled out,
as ¢ of course cannot exceed one.
13Figure 2: National mergers with national regulation
R = 1 R = 0
¢ = 0






merger proposed and permitted
merger not proposed
Hence, the larger is the home market relative to the world market, the higher is the
critical value of ¢ that is required for an increase in total domestic surplus.
More generally, it is shown in the appendix that the critical cost reduction from a
perspective of national surplus maximization, ¢¤, exceeds the critical cost reduction
from the perspective of the merging ¯rms, ~ ¢ [eq. (12)], for any level of R. This result
implies that there is a range of cost reductions ¢¤ > ¢ > ~ ¢ for which a merger is
in the private interest of domestic ¯rms, but not in the interest of the home country
as a whole. The reason is the negative `external e®ect' (in the language of Farrell and
Shapiro, 1990) on domestic consumers. A national merger control authority that is
concerned with maximizing total domestic surplus will reject the merger proposal for
such values of ¢. When the world market is large (R is small), the range of ¢ for
which the merger is blocked becomes smaller, as most of the burden of higher prices
is then borne by consumers in the world market. Figure 2 shows the range of relative
size parameters R and cost savings ¢ for which a merger is privately pro¯table, and
is either permitted or rejected by a national regulator. The optimal policy towards a
national merger is summarized in
Result 4: (Nationally optimal merger policy.) A national merger authority that max-
imizes total national surplus will accept a proposed merger, if (15) holds. For the range



























of cost reductions ¢¤ > ¢ > ~ ¢, a merger increases the pro¯ts of domestic ¯rms, but
reduces total national surplus.
4.2 Globally optimal merger policy
When deciding on a merger proposal, national governments in our model neglect two
externalities that are caused by the domestic merger: (i) the e®ect on the producer
surplus earned by foreign ¯rms; and (ii) the e®ect on consumer surplus in the world
market.13 To complete our analysis of the welfare e®ects of mergers, Table 3 summarizes
the consumer surplus in the world market in each of the di®erent merger scenarios.
We ¯rst consider the case where foreign ¯rms have not merged. The change in foreign
producer surplus caused by a domestic merger is inferred from Table 1. The foreign


















This is just the condition under which the share of foreign ¯rms in the world market
will rise (see our discussion in Section 3).


















Taken together, eqs. (16) and (17) imply that the (external) externalities caused by
a domestic merger are counteracting for any level of ¢, since the turning points for
13Such externalities on foreigners are termed `external external e®ects' by Barros and Cabral (1994).
15the signs of the individual e®ects coincide. If the merger causes only a moderate cost
reduction [¢ < (a¡1)=5], then the domestic merger will bene¯t foreign producers, but
hurt consumers in the world market. If, on the other hand, the cost reduction is large
[¢ > (a ¡ 1)=5], then both of these externalities will change sign, and the merger now
hurts foreign producers while bene¯tting consumers in the world market.
To determine the net externality caused by the domestic merger, we have to add up
©1 in (16) and ©2 in (17). It is shown in the appendix that the joint e®ect of a
national merger on foreign producers and world consumers is strictly non-negative in
our framework. For ¢ < (a ¡ 1)=5, the positive externality that a domestic merger
causes for foreign producers exceeds the negative e®ect on world consumers, whereas
for ¢ > (a ¡ 1)=5, the positive externality of a domestic merger on world consumers
exceeds the negative e®ect on foreign producer surplus.
De¯ning ¢¤¤ as the critical cost reduction needed to increase global welfare, we get
¢




(12R + 23)(500R + 81)=225 + (12R + 5)2
(12R + 5)2 ¡ 1
#
: (18)
If the world market is negligible (R ! 1), this critical value approaches ¢¤¤ ¼
0:089(a ¡ 1), the same as the limiting value in the case of national welfare maxi-
mization. (In this case, of course, the external externalities are also negligible.) If the
world market is very large relative to the home market (R ! 0), then the critical value
is ¢¤¤ ¼ 0:033(a¡1), which is less than the corresponding value under the total surplus
criterion for national welfare maximization. This re°ects that the sum of externalities
on agents in F and W is strictly positive in this range. More generally, it is shown in
the appendix that ¢¤¤ < ¢¤ holds for all ¯nite values of R. Hence, there is a range
of cost reductions for which the merger increases global welfare, but is nevertheless re-
jected by a national government that maximizes total domestic surplus. In our model,
domestic merger policy will therefore be `too restrictive' towards national mergers from
a perspective of global surplus maximization.
In the case where foreign ¯rms have already merged, completely analogous results
obtain. In particular, the e®ects of a domestic merger on the producer surplus of the
foreign (merged) ¯rm and on consumers in the world market have the same signs as
in eqs. (16) and (17), and the turning point for the sign of each externality is again
¢F = ¢W = (a ¡ 1)=5. Our ¯ndings are summarized in
16Result 5: (Domestic vs. global welfare maximization.) A domestic merger that raises
total national surplus will also raise total surplus worldwide. For moderate cost reduc-
tions (¢ < (a ¡ 1)=5) the gains to foreign producers exceed the losses to world con-
sumers; whereas for large cost reductions (¢ > (a¡1)=5) the gains to world consumers
exceed the losses to foreign producers.
5 International mergers
A di®erent scenario that can readily be addressed in our framework is a cross-country
merger, say between H's ¯rm 1 and F's ¯rm 1. In each of the markets H and F, the
merged ¯rm is still part of a duopoly, but it may now have gained a cost advantage
over its domestic competitor. In the world market W, the merged ¯rm acts as one com-
petitor, thus reducing the total number of ¯rms in this market to three. In this section
we analyze the optimal policies towards such international mergers, and compare them
to the results derived above for the case of national mergers.
In the home market (and equivalently in market F), pro¯t maximization by the merged
¯rm 1 (with unit cost of 1¡¢I) and its competitor (with unit costs of 1) yields Cournot
duopoly outputs of xI
1 = [a¡1+2¢I]=(3b), respectively xI
2 = [a¡1¡¢I]=(3b), where
the superscript `I' stands for an international merger. The resulting market price is
pI = (a + 2 ¡ ¢I)=3, showing that the cost savings by the merged ¯rm are partly










Comparing (19) to (2) shows immediately that an international merger can never hurt
consumers in either country H or F, even if ¢I = 0.
The producer surplus of the merged ¯rm and the non-merged ¯rm (subscript `N') in



















In comparison to a national merger, which causes a domestic monopoly [cf. (8)], the
producer surplus of the merged ¯rm (in both countries together) is now increased by
17less. In the world market, the e®ects of an international merger are the same as those
caused by a national merger, and the surplus of the merged ¯rm and its competitors
in eqs. (9){(10) is unchanged from our treatment in Section 3. Hence PSM = PSI
and PSM
N = PSI
N. Note, ¯nally, that the surpluses of both the merged ¯rm and the
non-merged ¯rms are now divided equally between countries H and F.
5.1 Privately pro¯table international merger
The condition for the merger to be privately pro¯table is derived in the Appendix and
given by
¢
I > ~ ¢




(64R + 27)2 + 2:52(128R + 81)
(64R + 27)2 ¡ 1
#
: (21)
As in the case of national mergers [eq. (12)], equation (21) determines the critical cost
reduction ~ ¢I for varying levels of the relative market size parameter R. It is seen that,
in contrast to a national merger, an international merger can never be pro¯table in
the absence of cost savings (i.e., for ¢I = 0). This is because the merged ¯rm will
have no gains in markets H and F in this case, relative to the pre-merger situation,
while its joint market share in country W falls. If the world market is of negligible size
(R ! 1), l' H^ opital's rule gives ~ ¢I = 0. Not surprisingly, in the other extreme case
where only the world market matters (R ! 0), the critical cost reduction is the same
as the limit value for a national merger, ~ ¢I = (a ¡ 1)(
p
1:28 ¡ 1)=3 ¼ (a ¡ 1)0:044.
Moreover, it is shown in the appendix that, for any positive level of R, condition (21)
is stricter than the corresponding condition for a national merger [eq. (12)].
Note that if a merger between a ¯rst pair of ¯rms in countries H and F is pro¯table,
then the same is also true for a merger between the second pair of ¯rms. The reasoning
is analogous to the one in the case of national mergers (Results 2 and 3). The di®erence
between the ¯rst and the second merger lies only in their e®ect on the world market,
and the change from three to two suppliers will lead to a larger price increase in this
market than the move from four to three suppliers. Hence, if the ¯rst international
merger takes place, so will the second.14
14In parallel with the analysis in Section 4, we here investigate `conditional' international-merger
equilibria. Unconditional (endogenous) merger equilibria are the subject of Section 6.
18Result 6. (International merger.) A merger between one home ¯rm and one foreign
¯rm increases the joint producer surplus if (21) holds. The required cost reduction
is always higher or equal than in the case of a national merger. If (21) holds, the
conditional merger equilibrium will feature two internationally merged ¯rms.
5.2 Regional policies towards cross-country mergers
We now consider optimal policy towards international mergers. For the cross-country
merger considered here, it is natural to assume that merger control is in the hands of a
regional merger authority. This is in line, for example, with the division of competences
for merger control in the European Union. We assume that this regional regulator
maximizes the total joint surplus in countries H and F. However, due to the complete
symmetry of the model in the case of cross-country mergers, it is su±cient to evaluate
the total surplus in the home country. In addition to the surplus of the merged ¯rm,
this measure includes the consumer surplus in the home market in (19) and the pro¯ts
of the non-merged home ¯rm in (20). We have already established that consumers in
countries H and F will bene¯t from any international merger that is accompanied by
a positive cost reduction. The cost reduction needed to raise the home country's total
surplus is (see the appendix)
¢




(64R + 9)2 ¡ 3:96(176R + 99)
(64R + 9)2 ¡ 1
#
: (22)
This expression equals zero, if the world market is of negligible size (R ! 1), and
it is negative when the world market is very large (R ! 0). This shows that the
national government will accept any international merger that is proposed. The core
di®erence to the case of a national merger (Result 4) is that the merged ¯rm will still
face a domestic competitor in the home market. In the absence of a world market, both
producers and consumers in the home country will just be indi®erent towards a merger
that entails no cost reductions.15 Adding the world market to the picture, the home
15This corresponds to the benchmark result in Cournot models that the aggregate external e®ect of
a merger cannot be negative, if the merging ¯rms have a market share of at most 50% (Levin, 1990).
For the international merger considered here, this market share is just 50% when ¢I = 0.
19Figure 3: International mergers with national or regional regulation
R = 1 R = 0
¢ = 0
¢ = 0:1(a ¡ 1)
0:044(a ¡ 1)
merger not proposed
merger proposed and permitted
country always gains from the merger, even in the absence of cost savings, because the
merger increases concentration and consumer prices in market W.
On account of symmetry, the e®ects of the international merger on the total surplus in
countries H and F taken together will just be twice the isolated e®ect on country H.
Therefore, the critical value derived in (22) is unchanged if joint surplus maximization
in the producing countries H and F is the policy objective. Figure 3 shows the parameter
combinations for which international mergers are proposed and cleared by the regional
merger authority. We summarize in
Result 7: (Optimal policy towards international merger.) An international merger
will never be blocked by a regulator that maximizes total joint surplus in H and F.
5.3 Global welfare
It remains to determine whether it is possible for an international merger to raise the
pro¯ts of the merging ¯rms and total surplus in countries H and F, but nevertheless
reduce total surplus worldwide. This is not a trivial issue, given that we know from
our previous analysis that consumers in country W will be hurt by a merger that is
accompanied by only moderate cost reductions. The critical cost reduction required for
20the international merger to increase global welfare is (see the appendix)
¢
I > ¢




(128R + 45)2 + 3:24(352R + 207)
(128R + 45)2 ¡ 1
#
: (23)
Evaluating this expression for R = 0 shows that ¢I¤¤¯
¯
R=0 ¼ 0:033(a ¡ 1). If the
world market is very large, the cost reduction that makes the merger pro¯table for the
involved ¯rms will also ensure that the merger increases total surplus worldwide. In
the other extreme case where only the home market matters, ¢¤¤jR!1 = 0, which is
the same threshold as for total national surplus to increase. More generally, it is shown
in the appendix that in our set-up ¢I¤¤ · ~ ¢I holds for any level of R. Hence we have
Result 8: (Global welfare e®ects of international merger.) Any international merger
that raises the producer surplus of the merged ¯rms will also increase global surplus.
From a perspective of global surplus maximization, there is thus no need for either
national or regional control of international mergers in our model. The reason is that
an international merger does not create a monopoly in either the home or the foreign
market, and hence will be pro¯table for the merging ¯rms only if cost reductions are
su±ciently high. This threshold is in turn su±cient to ensure that global world surplus
increases. Note, however, that some of the gains to the producing countries H and F
come at the expense of consumers in country W, whose surplus is still reduced by the
international merger as long as ¢I < ¢W = (a ¡ 1)=5.
6 Endogenous merger equilibria
A recent development in the merger literature is that the ¯rms' choice between di®erent
possible partners is endogenised. Horn and Persson (2001a, 2001b) treat mergers as a
cooperative game of coalition formation and show that an equilibrium market structure
maximizes the sum of industry pro¯ts, rather than just the pro¯ts of the merging
¯rms. This result is very intuitive: if total industry pro¯ts are not maximized under a
given ownership structure, then there will always be an incentive for at least one ¯rm
(including those which have not merged) to make a merger o®er to some other ¯rm
21that leaves both of these ¯rms better o®.16
It is straightforward to apply this general approach to our simple model. As we have
argued above for both national and international mergers, any conditional merger equi-
librium will feature either no mergers at all, or two merged ¯rms (Results 3 and 6).
Hence all that remains to be analyzed is under which conditions the equilibrium own-
ership structure is characterized by two national ¯rms, two international ¯rms, or no
mergers at all.17
If the cost savings associated with a national and an international merger is the same
(¢ = ¢I), then we already know (from Result 6) that ¯rms will always prefer the
national mergers, as this will give them monopoly power in their respective home mar-
kets. However, as we have discussed in Section 4, these mergers may not be permitted
by national merger authorities. In such cases only international mergers are feasible
and this will also be the merger equilibrium, provided that cross-border mergers are
privately pro¯table.
Figure 4 summarizes the equilibrium merger structure for di®erent parameter combi-
nations when national mergers are regulated by national merger authorities and cross-
country mergers are regulated by a regional merger authority. Higher cost savings are
associated with more national mergers in equilibrium, because ¯rms always prefer na-
tional over international mergers, and (national) merger authorities will accept more
national mergers in this case. Similarly, a large relative size of the world market (R ! 0)
implies that most of the losses in consumer surplus occur in third countries, which again
16In general, only the sum of pro¯ts among the decisive owners matters for the equilibrium merger
structure (Horn and Persson, 2001b). In our model, however, the owners of all ¯rms are decisive.
17In line with the relevant literature, we exclude the case of a worldwide monopoly. The latter
would obviously be in the interest of all ¯rms, but it would also go against consumer interests in all
countries. Having excluded worldwide monopoly, there is in principle one more merger outcome to
consider. This is the `double-merger' situation, where, say, the two country H ¯rms and one of the F
¯rms merge. This outcome creates a monopoly in H, but only duopoly in F and W. We shall ignore
this outcome in the following, for two reasons: First, the four ¯rms together will typically prefer the
outcome with two national mergers, as this allows deeper exploitation of cost reduction and monopoly
power. Second, merger authorities in country H are likely to be rather unsympathetic to the twin-
merger, as it implicitly leads to a loss of market share in W for H's shareholders (they get to own 2/3
of the merged ¯rm which has only around half of the world market).
22Figure 4: Equilibrium merger structure with national regulation
R = 1 R = 0
¢ = 0






will induce national merger authorities to accept a larger share of national mergers.
In contrast, if the share of sales in world markets is low (R ! 1), and cost savings
are moderate, then the equilibrium market structure is characterized by cross-border
mergers. Finally, if the world market is relatively large and cost savings are close to
zero, then no mergers will occur in equilibrium.
The assumption that cost savings are identical for a national and a regional merger
is, however, a restrictive one. Reasons why international mergers may be associated
with higher cost savings include reduced aggregate transport costs (Horn and Persson,
2001a; Bjorvatn, 2004), higher synergies due to a more diverse knowledge base, or a
weakening of national trade unions as a result of international mergers (Lommerud,
Straume and S¿rgard, 2005).
In our model, comparing total industry pro¯ts for national and international mergers
in the case where ¢ < ¢I involves only to compute total producer surplus in the home
market. The surplus in the foreign market will be symmetric, whereas the surplus in
the world market is the same under the two di®erent types of duopoly. Subtracting the
producer surplus of the merged ¯rm in the case of a national merger [eq. (8)] from the




























23The critical value of ¢I for which the international merger causes higher total industry
pro¯ts, is then
¢
I > ^ ¢
I =
¡2(a ¡ 1) +
p
4(a ¡ 1)2 + 5f(a ¡ 1)2 + 9¢[¢ + 2(a ¡ 1)]g
10
: (24)
Clearly, the minimum required cost savings that make the international mergers more
pro¯table (^ ¢I) are a rising function of the cost savings arising from a national merger.
In the special case where the latter does not cause any cost reduction (¢ = 0), interna-
tional mergers will be more pro¯table for the industry as a whole, if they lead to cost
savings of at least ^ ¢I = (a ¡ 1)=10. If this condition is ful¯lled, then the endogenous
equilibrium ownership structure will always be one with two internationally merged
¯rms. This is summarized in our last result:
Result 9: (Endogenous merger equilibrium.) If domestic and international mergers
lead to identical cost savings, then the equilibrium market structure is characterized by
international mergers, if cost savings are moderate and the share of sales in third mar-
kets is low. The equilibrium market structure will also be characterized by international
mergers, whenever condition (24) holds.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have set up a simple three-country model with segmented markets and
Cournot competition between ¯rms. A home country and a foreign country both have
two domestic ¯rms which supply the respective domestic markets plus a third (world)
market. Within this set-up we have formally analyzed the e®ects of national and cross-
border mergers on the ¯rms involved, on selected groups of consumers, and on the
world as a whole. We argued that when national merger authorities pursue national
surplus, they tend to be overly restrictive vis-a-vis national mergers, so some proposed
national mergers will be rejected by authorities despite being bene¯cial from a world
perspective. In contrast, proposed international mergers will be e±ciently cleared by
national and regional authorities. Finally, we considered endogenous merger formation
and demonstrated how the possible outcomes { no merger, twin-national merger, or
24twin-international merger { depend on both the extent of cost reduction accompanying
a merger and the size of the world market relative to the national markets.
Despite its simplicity, our model allows to derive a foundation for the empirical observa-
tion that mergers seem to come in waves. In particular, we found that whenever any two
of the four ¯rms in our model decides to merge, either within a country or cross-border,
so will the remaining two ¯rms. Further, a striking result of our analysis is the pro-
nounced di®erence between national and international mergers. This result captures,
in a stylized form, an important asymmetry between national and cross-border merg-
ers in markets where national players dominate. In these markets a national merger
will indeed reduce the number of ¯rms that actively supply the market, whereas an
international merger will not. Our model shows that the conditions for an international
merger to be in the interest of the participating ¯rms are unambiguously stricter than
in the case of a national merger, but when indeed proposed, international mergers
will not be vetoed by neither national nor regional merger authorities. This ¯nding is
compatible with the permissive stance of merger control at the level of the European
Union: of almost 1600 merger proposals that the European Commission had to decide
upon until the end of 2000, more than 85 per cent were accepted immediately and only
13 mergers, or less than 1 per cent, were ¯nally rejected (Schmidt, 2001, p. 237).
Lastly, our analysis does not lend support to the hypothesis that national or regional
merger policy is used as a beggar-thy-neighbour instrument. This is partly due to
the property of the Cournot oligopoly model that a merger will typically bene¯t the
¯rms that are not participating in it. There is another element in our model which is
responsible for this result, however. It is well known that the strategic e®ects of national
policies are strongest when all domestic output is sold in a third market. This setting
underlies, for example, the result of De Stefano and Rysman (2004) that countries will
always favour a single national champion, as this policy allows them to use strategic
trade policies most e®ectively. In contrast, in our model the output of the merged
¯rm is also consumed in the country that undertakes the regulation. This ensures that
mergers are not accepted unless they are associated with cost savings, which outweigh
the e±ciency losses resulting from reduced competition at home.
25Appendix
A. National merger
Nationally optimal merger policy: We add (14) and (11) in the case where the






























Multiplying by B, introducing R = B=b and solving for ¢¤ yields (15).
To see that ¢¤ > ~ ¢ for any level of R, note ¯rst from (A.1) that ¤(¢) ´ ¡(¢)+£(¢)
is monotonically increasing in ¢. Moreover, ¤(~ ¢) < 0 since ¡(~ ¢) = 0 [eq. (11)] and
£(~ ¢) < 0 [eq. (14)] . Hence we can unambiguously infer that ¢¤, which solves (A.1),
must exceed ~ ¢.
Globally optimal merger policy: To determine the net externality caused by the






2 ¡ 10¢(a ¡ 1) + (a ¡ 1)
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¸ 0 (A.2)
which is positive for all values of ¢ 6= (a ¡ 1)=5 and zero for ¢ = (a ¡ 1)=5.





























which is negative at ¢ = 0 and monotonically rising in ¢. The condition ­ = 0 implic-
itly determines the critical level of cost reductions, ¢¤¤ given in (18), which is positive
for any level of R. Since ¤(¢¤) = 0 and ©(¢¤) ¸ 0, it follows that ­(¢¤) ¸ 0, with
the inequality holding strictly when ¢¤ 6= (a ¡ 1)=5. From the positive monotonicity
of ­(¢) it then follows that ¢¤¤ · ¢¤.
18Foreign consumer surplus is not included in this welfare measure, because it is una®ected by the
domestic merger.
26B. International merger
Pro¯tability for merging ¯rms: The change in producer surplus for the merging
¯rms is psI + PSI ¡ ps ¡ PS > 0. Using eqs. (2), (5), (9) and (20), this gives
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Setting (A.4) equal to zero, multiplying by B, introducing R = B=b and solving for ¢I
gives (21).
To show that the critical cost reduction needed to bene¯t the merging ¯rms [eq. (21)]
is always stricter (or equally strict) than the parallel condition for a national merger
[eq. (12)], we evaluate the net gain to the ¯rms from an international merger, ¡I
in (A.4), at the critical level of cost reduction for the national merger ( ~ ¢I) and show
that ¡I( ~ ¢I) · 0. Substituting (12) into (A.4) and rearranging gives
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(512R2 + 708R + 243)(63 ¡ 100R)(4R + 9)
225(4R + 3)2
For R = 0 it is easily con¯rmed that ¡I( ~ ¢I) = 0. Moreover, straightforward, but
tedious calculations show that d¡I( ~ ¢I)=dR < 0, establishing the result.19
Regionally optimal merger policy: The sum of all changes in domestic surplus is,

























Setting this equal to zero, introducing R = B=b and solving for ¢I gives (22).
Globally optimal merger policy: The sum of all welfare changes caused by the
international merger is (i) the change in total surpluses in H and F which, due to
19We have performed these calculations using Mathematica. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
27symmetry are two times the change given in (A.5); and (ii) the change in consumer

























This sum is negative at ¢I = 0 and monotonically rising in ¢I. Introducing R and
setting ­I = 0 gives (23).
To prove that any international merger that raises the pro¯ts of the merged ¯rm will
also raise world welfare, we have to show that ­I in (A.6) is positive when evaluated
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(128R + 54)2 + 10:08(128R + 81)
(128R + 54)2 :
Evaluating this with Mathematica shows that ­I (~ ¢I) > 0 holds for all ¯nite levels of
R, with ­I (~ ¢I) ! 0 for R ! 1.
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